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We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees
are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away.
In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed
in practice. It also makes a number of predictions for the cross-sectional distribution of firm leverage.
Consistent with existing empirical evidence, it implies persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage
across firms. An important new empirical prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, firms with
more leverage should pay higher wages.
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Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) ﬁrst showed that capital structure is irrelevant in
a frictionless economy, ﬁnancial economists have puzzled over exactly what frictions make
the capital structure decision so important in reality. Several compelling arguments for the
optimality of debt ﬁnancing have been proposed, the most important by Modigliani and
Miller themselves: Dividends are subject to corporate taxation while interest payments are
not, so ﬁrms can potentially realize signiﬁcant tax savings by maintaining high levels of debt.
However, in practice, ﬁrms maintain only modest levels of debt. As Miller (1988) pointed
out in a 30 year retrospective on his own work:
“In sum, many ﬁnance specialists, myself included, remain unconvinced that the
high-leverage route to corporate tax savings was either technically unfeasible or
prohibitively expensive in terms of bankruptcy or agency costs.” (p. 113)
Miller goes on to argue that corporate debt levels result from sub-optimal decision making,
and points to two innovations that were happening at the time of the retrospective – the
growth in junk bond markets and an explosion in the number of LBOs – as evidence of
employees changing behavior and movement towards more “optimal” debt levels. However,
subsequent developments have not borne out Miller’s prediction. In a recent study, Graham
(2000) ﬁnds (p. 1903) that “...even extreme estimates of distress costs do not justify observed
debt policies.” Why, then, do many ﬁrms appear to have too little debt?
Clearly, an opposing friction must exist. However, economists have struggled to identify
it. Direct bankruptcy costs are one candidate: High levels of debt increase the probability of
bankruptcy, so any costs associated with bankruptcy will be a disincentive to issue debt (see
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)). However, in an important paper, Haugen and Senbet (1978)
point out these costs cannot exceed the cost of negotiating around them (otherwise debt
holders would have an incentive to avoid them by recapitalizing the ﬁrm outside bankruptcy).
This argument signiﬁcantly limits the potential role of direct bankruptcy costs as an eﬀective
counterweight to the large beneﬁt of the tax shield.
In response to Haugen and Senbet’s critique, Titman (1984) argues that another possible
explanation for existing debt levels is the indirect costs of bankruptcy — costs precipitated by
the bankruptcy ﬁling that aﬀect stakeholders other than debt and equity holders. Although
an extensive literature documenting and studying these costs has developed since Titman’s
insight, researchers have nevertheless struggled to identify a speciﬁc indirect bankruptcy cost
large enough to oﬀset the beneﬁts of debt.1 In this paper we argue that the cost borne by
the ﬁrm’s employees is just such a cost.
1See, for example, Andrade and Kaplan (1998).
1An interesting characteristic of the existing literature on bankruptcy costs is the apparent
disconnect between the costs that researchers study and those identiﬁed in the popular press.
During a corporate bankruptcy, a major focus of the popular press is on the human costs
of bankruptcy, yet these have received minimal attention in the research literature. It is
not diﬃcult to understand why. If employees are being paid their competitive wage, it
should not be very costly to ﬁnd a new job at the same wage. For substantial human costs of
bankruptcy to exist, employees must be entrenched — they must incur costs associated either
with not being able to ﬁnd an alternative job, or with taking another job at substantially
lower pay. At ﬁrst blush, such entrenchment seems diﬃcult to reconcile with optimizing
behavior: Even if labor markets are ineﬃcient, why do shareholders ignore this ineﬃciency,
and instead overpay their employees, especially at times when the ﬁrm is facing the prospect
of bankruptcy?2
In this paper we argue, extending an insight in Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982), that this
intuition is wrong. In an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets,
one should expect employees to face large human costs of bankruptcy. It is precisely these
indirect costs that limit the use of corporate debt.
In a setting without bankruptcy, Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982) show that the optimal
employment contract guarantees job security (employees are never ﬁred), and pays employees
a ﬁxed wage that never goes down, but rises in response to good news about employee
ability. Consequently, most employees eventually become entrenched. The intuition behind
this result is that, while employees are averse to their own human capital risk, this risk is
idiosyncratic, so equity holders can costlessly diversify it away. Optimal risk sharing then
implies that the shareholders will bear all of this risk by oﬀering employees a ﬁxed wage
contract. However, employees cannot be forced to work under such a contract. Employees
who turn out to be better than expected will threaten to quit unless they get a pay raise.
This leads to the optimal contract derived by Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982).3
In Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982), ﬁrms have no debt, and equity holders have unlimited
liability (to credibly commit to the terms of the contract, equity holders must make the
wage payments even when the ﬁrm cannot). In principle, there is no reason why the optimal
equity contract requires limited liability. However, such contracts would be very diﬃcult to
trade in anonymous markets. Without the ability to trade, equity holders would no longer
2Firm-speciﬁc human capital is one possible explanation (see Neal (1995)). Yet, in an eﬃcient labor
market, it is not clear that employees are necessarily paid for their investments in human capital. Even if
they are, in a competitive economy like the United States it is hard to argue that most employees’ skills are
not easily transferable, or that wages could not be lowered during ﬁnancial distress.
3Several other papers in labor economics have studied optimal wages when the ﬁrm is risk neutral but the
workers are risk averse. See, for example, Holmstr¨ om (1983), Bester (1983), or Thomas and Worrall (1988).
2be able to diversify costlessly, and so the underlying assumption that they are not averse to
human capital risk would be diﬃcult to support. Hence, allowing for limited liability equity
is important.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to derive the optimal compensation contract in a setting that
includes both (limited liability) equity and debt. We ﬁnd that the optimal employment
contract in this setting is similar to that in Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982): Unless the ﬁrm
is in ﬁnancial distress, wages never fall, and they rise whenever employees turn out to be
more productive than expected. However, if the ﬁrm cannot make interest payments at
the contracted wage level, the employee takes a temporary pay cut to ensure full payment
of the debt. If the ﬁnancial health of the ﬁrm improves, wages return to their contracted
level. If it deteriorates further, and the ﬁrm cannot make interest payments even with wage
concessions, it is forced into bankruptcy, where it can abrogate its contracts. Employees can
be terminated, and more productive employees can be hired to replace them. As a result,
entrenched employees face substantial costs — they are forced to take a wage cut and earn
their current market wage, either with the current ﬁrm or with a new ﬁrm.
The form of this optimal employment contract has important implications for capital
structure. As in Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982), most employees are likely to become en-
trenched. Because such employees are being paid more than the value they create, investors
in the ﬁrm actually beneﬁt from a bankruptcy ﬁling. Investors thus have no incentive to
avoid bankruptcy by, for example, injecting more capital, and Haugen and Senbet’s critique
does not apply. Implications for the optimal debt level occur ex ante. The amount of risk
sharing between investors and employees depends on the level of debt — higher debt levels
imply a higher probability of bankruptcy and thus less risk sharing. With corporate taxes
a theory of optimal capital structure emerges that trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of risk sharing
against the beneﬁts of the tax shields, and can resolve the apparent puzzles in the data.
Firms optimally issue only modest levels of debt, and in fact, in some cases, will maintain
cash balances despite the associated tax disadvantages.
Our model identiﬁes a number of determinants of the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrm
leverage that have not previously been investigated. Perhaps most interesting, given the
empirical evidence, is our result that ﬁrms’ capital structure decisions should be inﬂuenced
by eﬀects idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm. Because the capital structure decision trades oﬀ the
risk aversion of employees against the beneﬁts of debt, ﬁrms that happen to have more risk
averse employees will have lower levels of debt. But because such ﬁrms have lower levels of
debt, they will represent attractive employment opportunities for relatively more risk averse
employees. The eﬀect is thus self-reinforcing. Ultimately, heterogeneity in risk aversion
in the labor market should result in a clientele eﬀect, implying persistent heterogeneity in
3the average risk aversion of employees, and in capital structure choices amongst otherwise
identical ﬁrms. Our model may thus help to explain the persistent heterogeneity in ﬁrms’
capital structures that has puzzled ﬁnancial economists.
Our model makes several other empirical predictions. Ceteris paribus, higher wages
should be associated with higher leverage. Further, imposing the additional assumption that
capital is less risky than labor, labor intensive ﬁrms should have lower leverage than capital
intensive ﬁrms. In addition, because capital intensive ﬁrms tend to be larger (especially if
accounting numbers are used as a measure of ﬁrm size), a cross-sectional relation between
debt levels and ﬁrm size should exist — large ﬁrms will be more highly levered.4 Finally,
our model also predicts a positive relation between ﬁrm size and wages. This relation has
been documented empirically, and is regarded as a puzzle by labor economists (see Brown
and Medoﬀ (1989)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the related
literature. In Section 3 we describe the model and derive the optimal labor contract in our
setting. In Section 4 we derive the empirical implications of the optimal contract for the
ﬁrm’s capital structure. We then parameterize the model and illustrate its implications.
Section 5 discusses a number of existing studies that bear directly on the implications of the
model. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Review of the Literature
In response to the Haugen and Senbet (1978) critique, Titman (1984) introduces the idea of
indirect bankruptcy costs. He argues that stakeholders not represented at the bankruptcy
bargaining table, such as customers, can suﬀer material costs resulting from the bankruptcy.
Because the claimants at the bargaining table (the debt and equity holders) do not incur
these costs, they have no incentive to negotiate around them, so such costs can be substan-
tial. We argue in this paper that the cost borne by employees, although it has received
limited attention in the literature, is potentially the single most important indirect cost of
bankruptcy.
Several papers have analyzed the interaction between capital structure choice and the
ﬁrm’s employees’ compensation and incentives. Like us, Chang (1992) analyzes the optimal
contract between investors and employees, but with a very diﬀerent focus. He does not
model either the ability of the employees or the role of labor markets. Instead, in his
4This prediction is supported by the existing empirical evidence. Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan
and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) all document a positive cross-sectional relation between
leverage and ﬁrm size.
4model, investors can force a value enhancing restructuring that is costly for employees in
bankruptcy. Issuing more debt makes bankruptcy, and the associated restructuring, more
likely. Optimal leverage is determined by maximizing ﬁrm value subject to this tradeoﬀ.
In a related paper, Chang (1993) focuses on the interaction between payout policy, capital
structure and compensation contracts. Managers are induced to pay dividends through their
compensation contracts; bankruptcy serves as an opportunity for investors to get information
on the optimal payout level and hence to restructure the ﬁrm. By issuing the right amount of
debt ex ante, bankruptcy occurs in states when new information about the optimal payout
level is likely to be available. Our paper shares a key insight with both Chang (1992)
and Chang (1993), namely, that bankruptcy triggers recontracting. However, although this
recontracting is value-enhancing ex post in both models, it represents an ex-ante cost of
debt in our model (because it reduces risk sharing) but an ex-ante beneﬁt in Chang’s models
(because it allows managers to precommit). Chang (1992) and Chang (1993) therefore
identify new beneﬁts of debt that reinforces its tax advantages. In contrast, our model
identiﬁes a disadvantage of debt that can serve to counterbalance these tax advantages.
Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel (2000) also study the relation between managerial com-
pensation and capital structure, but their focus is diﬀerent. In their paper, compensation
policy is designed to incentivize managers to exert costly eﬀort; risk-sharing diﬀerences be-
tween employees and investors are ignored. We do the opposite, ignoring incentive issues
and concentrating on risk. Interestingly, like us, that paper derives the empirical prediction
that leverage and wages should be positively correlated in the cross-section.
In an early contribution, Baldwin (1983) models a ﬁrm in which employees can appro-
priate the return to capital after capital costs have been sunk. Issuing a suﬃcient amount
of debt may mitigate this hold-up problem, but bankruptcy is assumed to be costly for
workers. Perotti and Spier (1993) emphasize a similar role of debt. In their model equity
holders may issue junior debt, thereby creating an underinvestment incentive. This can then
be used to obtain wage concessions from employees to restore incentives to invest. Stulz
(1990) analyzes a ﬁrm where shareholders cannot observe either the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows or the
employee’s investment decisions. Management always wants to invest as much as possible.
Because shareholders know this, they will not always fully satisfy the employee’s demand for
capital. Therefore the employee cannot take all positive NPV projects when the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂows are low and its investment opportunities are good, and will overinvest when the ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂows are high and its investment opportunities are poor. It is shown that it is optimal
for investors to design a capital structure consisting of debt and equity to reduce the costs
of over- and underinvestment.
More recently, Cadenillas, Cvitani´ c, and Zapatero (2004) model a ﬁrm with a risk averse
5manager, who is subject to moral hazard. It is assumed that the manager receives stock as his
only source of compensation. Equityholders can choose to lever the ﬁrm, thereby changing
the manager’s compensation. When choosing the optimal leverage, they take into account
that the employee applies costly eﬀort and selects the level of volatility, both of which aﬀect
expected returns. DeMarzo and Fishman (2006) derive both the optimal capital structure
and labor contract in a diﬀerent moral hazard setting. In their model a risk-neutral agent
with limited capital seeks ﬁnancing for a project that pays stochastic cash ﬂows, which are
observable to the agent but unobservable to the investor. It is shown that the optimal
mechanism can be implemented by a combination of equity, long-term debt and a line of
credit.
Common to the papers discussed so far is their assumption that rents generated by
the choice of a particular capital structure accrue to equity holders or other investors. If
managers are entrenched, however, then they will receive at least some of the rents generated
by a particular choice of capital structure. Our paper is thus closely related to the literature
that examines capital structure in the presence of management entrenchment.
Zwiebel (1996) provides a formal model of an employee’s capital structure choice when
ownership is separated from control, and managers are entrenched. In this paper, an em-
ployee determines the ﬁrm’s capital structure, recognizing that he can only be ﬁred if the
ﬁrm is taken over or if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. Because the employee derives extra utility
from keeping his job, he wishes to avoid being replaced. In equilibrium, managers with
low abilities issue debt, and avoid being replaced by not taking on negative NPV projects.
Novaes and Zingales (1995) derive results in a similar setting but extend the analysis to
show how capital structure choices of the ﬁrm’s equityholders diﬀer from those made by
entrenched managers.
Morellec (2004) proposes a continuous-time model of an entrenched employee, who derives
utility from control, and may therefore ﬁnd it optimal to issue debt to avoid a hostile takeover.
He allows for a tax advantage of debt, so that there exists an optimal debt level even in
the absence of agency problems. The paper shows how the employee’s capital structure
choice deviates from the ﬁrm value maximizing capital structure. Subramanian (2002) also
analyzes a ﬁrm where the employee makes capital structure and investment decisions, taking
his personal bankruptcy costs and risk aversion into account. In each period, the employee’s
income is derived by a bargaining process with the equityholders. Neither paper considers
the eﬀect of a competitive labor market.
Our analysis diﬀers in several important ways from the literature discussed above. The
existing literature provides an additional advantage to debt. It takes managerial entrench-
ment as exogenous, relying on speciﬁed managerial characteristics, such as empire building
6preferences or eﬀort aversion, that destroy shareholder value, and cannot be eliminated by
appropriate compensation contracts. In contrast, one of our main contributions is to derive
managerial entrenchment as an optimal response to labor market competition. This optimal
response, in turn, has capital structure implications. In particular, debt is costly in our
model. The level of risk employees face determines the likelihood of employee entrenchment,
which then determines the ﬁrm’s leverage. We analyze this role of capital structure without
relying on moral hazard or asymmetric information, and solve for the optimal employees’
compensation under fairly mild contracting restrictions. Because we have no moral hazard
in our model, and we assume that both labor markets and capital markets are competitive,
ex ante the employee captures all the economic rents and makes the capital structure choice
that maximizes his utility. Consequently there is no ineﬃciency associated with entrench-
ment in our model — the only friction is the inability of employees to insure their human
capital, which is not a focus of the prior literature on entrenchment and capital structure.
Berens and Cuny (1995) provide an important alternative explanation for low leverage
ratios in the absence of signiﬁcant bankruptcy costs. They point out that interest payments
can only be deducted up to the amount of current income. For growing ﬁrms with relatively
low current cash ﬂows, there is little to shield, so the usefulness of debt is limited. Their
point is relevant even for ﬁrms with relatively modest growth rates. For example, using
historical estimates and assuming a zero real growth rate (so all growth in cashﬂows results
from inﬂation), Berens and Cuny (1995) show that the optimal debt ratio of a riskless ﬁrm
is 40%.5 Although this insight certainly explains why ﬁrms might limit their use of debt, it
cannot be the full story: Graham (2000) provides evidence that ﬁrms could increase leverage
substantially before the eﬀective corporate tax rates start to decrease. Thus, even relative
to their low initial earnings, growth ﬁrms still seem to under-utilize debt.
In a recent paper, Hennessy (2005) develops a model of indirect bankruptcy costs that,
like us, relies on the ability to abrogate contracts in bankruptcy, but his focus is diﬀerent.
He assumes the input quality delivered by the ﬁrm’s suppliers is unobservable. Incentives
must therefore be provided through implicit contracts, where bonus payments or refunds
from the supplier are discretionary. If the ﬁrm issues too much debt, then the supplier can
no longer be induced to produce optimal quality. The credibility of both ﬁrms declines, and
proﬁts fall.
Our paper is also related to the literature in labor economics that focuses on the risk-
sharing role of the ﬁrm. Gamber (1988) considers bankruptcy in a setting similar to Harris
and Holmstr¨ om’s, and derives as an implication that real wages should respond more to
5Tserlukevich (2005) expands the analysis of Berens and Cuny (1995) by explicitly modeling corporate
growth options when real investment is irreversible.
7permanent shocks than temporary shocks. He also ﬁnds empirical support for this prediction.
More recently, Guiso et al. (2005) test this implication using ﬁrm-level wage data. They also
ﬁnd strong support for the risk-sharing role of the ﬁrm. Our paper adds to this literature
by deriving another testable implication — leverage and wages should be inversely related.
3 Optimal Labor Contract
In this section, we derive the optimal contract for a risk-averse employee working for a
ﬁrm with risk-neutral investors. We extend the results of Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982) by
allowing for debt, limited liability equity and bankruptcy.
The economy contains a large number of identical ﬁrms, each of which begins life at
time 0, and lasts forever. Firms require two inputs to operate: Capital in the amount K,
and an employee who is paid a wage ct and produces, at time t, the fully observable (and
contractible) cash ﬂow, K R + φt. R is the pretax return on capital, which we assume to
be constant, and φt is the fully observable stochastic productivity of the employee, which is
assumed to follow a Markov process. Firms make their capital structure decision once, at
time 0, raising the required capital by issuing debt, D, and equity, K − D ≥ 0. The debt is
perpetual, and will turn out to be riskless (the ﬁrm will always be able to meet its interest
obligations), so it has a coupon rate of r, the risk free rate of interest. The ﬁrm must pay
corporate taxes at rate τ on earnings after interest expense, so the debt generates an interest
tax shield of Drτ.6 There are no personal taxes, so capital earns the risk free return, i.e.,
R ≡ r
1−τ. Thus, the ﬁrm produces after tax cash ﬂows of ( Kr
1−τ − Dr + φt − ct)(1 − τ) + Dr
at time t, Dr of which is paid out as interest on debt, and the rest is paid out as a dividend,
δt, given by
δt = Kr − Dr(1 − τ) + (φt − ct)(1 − τ). (1)
We assume that capital markets are perfectly competitive. The only source of risk in
the model is volatility in the employee’s output, which we assume is idiosyncratic to the
employee, and thus to the ﬁrm. Investors can therefore diversify this risk away, so the
expected return on all invested capital is the risk-free rate, r. We assume that capital
investment is irreversible, and that there is no depreciation.
Bankruptcy occurs at the stopping time T when the ﬁrm cannot meet its cash ﬂow
obligations. At that point, we assume all contracts can be unilaterally abrogated, so the ﬁrm
is no longer bound by the employee’s labor contract, and instead hires a new employee, who
6Although we focus on taxes, other advantages of debt examined in the literature include the unobserv-
ability of cash ﬂows (see Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)) or the inability of an entrepreneur
to commit human capital to the ﬁrm (see Hart and Moore (1994)).
8immediately puts the capital to productive use. Because there are no costs of bankruptcy,
the ﬁrm is restored to its initial state (and hence its initial value) and thus can meet its
interest obligations, which explains why the ﬁrm’s debt is riskless (and perpetual).
A bankruptcy ﬁling therefore creates value in our model. For simplicity, we assume that
equity holders are able to hold onto their equity stake, and hence capture this value. In
fact, the assumption that equity holders remain in control reﬂects the reality of Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection in the U.S.,7 but most of the results in this paper would remain valid
even if debt holders were to capture some or all of this value.
Because of our assumption that the ﬁrm can unilaterally abrogate all contracts in bankruptcy,
it will not make payments after a bankruptcy ﬁling to any ﬁred employee. The ﬁrm thus
cannot commit to severance payments, or to a corporate pension, after a bankruptcy ﬁling.
In addition, we also assume that a ﬁrm cannot make severance payments to a ﬁred employee
prior to bankruptcy. Although allowing such payments in our simple model would be Pareto
improving, they are suboptimal in a world with moral hazard, where the employee can inten-
tionally lower his productivity. We comment further on the implications of this assumption
in the conclusion.
There is a large, but ﬁnite, supply of employees with time separable expected utility, and




, where u0(·) > 0,
u00(·) < 0, and β ≡ e−r. Following Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982). we assume that employees
are constrained to consume their wages. They cannot borrow or lend,8 and can only earn
wage-based compensation. In particular, they cannot be paid in the form of securities
issued by the ﬁrm. This is not a strong assumption with regard to equity or stock options:
Because we place no restriction on the form of the wage contract, it includes the possibility
of a contract that matches the payoﬀ on any corporate security prior to bankruptcy. The
important restriction this assumption imposes is that it rules out compensation contracts
that survive bankruptcy. For example, we do not allow employees to be paid with corporate
debt.
To derive the optimal labor contract, we maximize the employee’s expected utility subject
to the constraints that the ﬁrm operates in a competitive capital and labor market. Under
7Equity holders can maintain control even in countries without Chapter 11 protection (see Str¨ omberg
(2000)).
8As Harris and Holmstr¨ om explain, if employees could borrow without an option to declare personal
bankruptcy, the ﬁrst best contract where the employee earns a ﬁxed wage forever is achievable, so as in
Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982) this constraint is binding. However, unlike Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982), in
our setting the savings constraint is also binding — employees have an incentive to save to partially mitigate
the eﬀects of a bankruptcy ﬁling. Relaxing this assumption would signiﬁcantly complicate the analysis, and
would not change the form of the optimal contract, but it would aﬀect the tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁts of
the tax shield and the amount of insurance.





























s−t ((φs − cs)(1 − τ) + Drτ) ds

, (2)
where VT = V0 because, at the point of bankruptcy, the ﬁrm is restored to its initial state.
The initial value of equity must equal the value of the capital supplied, V0 = K − D, so




s−t ((φs − cs)(1 − τ) + Drτ) ds

. (3)





t((φt − ct)(1 − τ) + Drτ)dt

= 0. (4)
Firms compete to hire ﬁnitely many employees of a given ability in a competitive labor
market. As a result, the ﬁrm cannot pay the employee less than his market wage (because
otherwise he would quit and work for another ﬁrm). So, at any subsequent date, ν, the value
of equity cannot exceed its time 0 value, Vν ≤ V0, (because if it did, the employee would be





t−ν((φt − ct)(1 − τ) + Drτ)dt

≤ 0, ∀ν ∈ [0,T]. (5)
Prior to bankruptcy, the ﬁrm must be able to meet its interest obligations. Thus, because
the dividend received by shareholders is never negative, the employee’s wages cannot exceed
the total cash generated by the ﬁrm less the amount required to service the debt, i.e.







For now we assume that bankruptcy occurs when the ﬁrm cannot make interest payments
10even when the employee gives up all of her wages, that is, when
Kr + φ(1 − τ) − Dr(1 − τ) = 0, (7)
or equivalently, when











 φt < φ
	
.
In principle, the employee could force bankruptcy to occur earlier by not giving up all her
wages, but we shall show later that this is not optimal.
At time 0, the optimal contract maximizes the employee’s utility while he is employed




















t−ν((φt − ct)(1 − τ) + Drτ)dt

≤ 0, ∀ν ∈ [0,T], (11)
(ct − φt)(1 − τ) − r[K − D(1 − τ)] ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [0,T]. (12)
Note that, while the ﬁrst two constraints are similar to those in Harris and Holmstr¨ om
(1982), the last, reﬂecting equityholders’ limited liability and the presence of debt, is new.
We now show that the optimal contract is an extension of that in Harris and Holmstr¨ om
(1982).
First deﬁne the market wage contract:
Deﬁnition 1 The market wage contract initiated at time t is a contract, together with an
associated market wage function, c∗(φ,t), under which an employee, hired at date t, is paid

















9Because the bankruptcy date does not depend on the choice of contract, the contract that maximizes
utility until bankruptcy also maximizes lifetime utility.







ν,s)(1 − τ) + Drτ)ds

= 0, (14)
for all ν ∈ [t,T].
At date s, deﬁne the promised wage to be maxt≤ν≤s {c∗(φν,ν)}, and the ﬁnancial distress





. Lemma 2 in the appendix shows that the initial wage under this
contract is always equal to the promised wage. Subsequently, the promised wage never falls,
but rises when necessary to match the wage a newly hired employee with the same ability
level would earn. However, after the initial date the employee does not always receive the
promised wage because the ﬁrm may not have enough cash left over after making its debt
payments. In these states, which we term ﬁnancial distress, the employee takes a temporary
pay cut, receiving whatever cash is left after the debt payments have been made (the ﬁnancial
distress wage), so that the ﬁrm can meet its interest obligations and avoid bankruptcy.
For some ability levels, c∗(φ,t) might not be positive. For example, for very low levels of φ,
it may be impossible to pay the employee any positive amount and still satisfy Equation (14).
Note, however, that by the deﬁnition of the market wage and the point of bankruptcy, if
c∗(φt,t) ≥ 0 then cs ≥ 0 for any s ∈ [t,T].
Deﬁne a feasible market wage contract at time t for an employee of ability φt as a contract
such that c∗(φt,t) > 0, that is, a contract that guarantees positive wages at all times prior
to bankruptcy. The following proposition (with proof in the appendix) shows that if the
market wage contract is feasible, it is optimal.
Proposition 1 If the market wage contract is feasible at time 0, it is the optimal contract
for an employee hired at time 0, that is, it is the unique solution to the program deﬁned by
Equations (9)–(12).
Proposition 1 shows that as long as the ﬁrm can meet its interest obligations without
cutting the employee’s wage, the optimal contract is similar to that in Harris and Holmstr¨ om
(1982): Wages never fall, and they rise in response to positive shocks in employee ability.
The main diﬀerence occurs when the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress, and the ﬁrm’s revenues,
less the promised wage, ct ≡ max0≤ν≤s {c∗(φν,ν)}, do not cover the interest owed:
Kr
1 − τ
+ φt − ct ≤ Dr,
12or equivalently when φt < φ∗, where
φ







The ﬁrm pays zero dividends when it is in distress, and the employee takes a temporary





+ φt − Dr,
≤ ct.
If the employee gives up all his wages and the ﬁrm still cannot make interest payments, it
is forced into bankruptcy. An earlier bankruptcy ﬁling cannot make the employee better oﬀ
because, by Lemma 1, an employee can never make more money at any point in the future
by accepting a new competitive wage contract (at another ﬁrm). So the employee cannot
be made worse oﬀ by delaying bankruptcy to the last possible moment, justifying our initial
assumption on T.
Note that when the employee loses his job at time T, he cannot ﬁnd another job at a
positive wage because 0 = cT ≥ c∗(φT,T). Hence, we assume that the employee chooses not
to work, and receives zero forever (eﬀectively, the reservation wage in this model).
4 Implementing the Optimal Contract
The inability of employees to fully insure their own human capital risk implies that ﬁrms
will have preference for equity. In reality, the tax deductibility of interest creates a strong
incentive to issue debt. In this section we derive testable implications of this tradeoﬀ.
We ﬁrst solve explicitly for the optimal contract oﬀered by the ﬁrm to the employee
for a given debt level. Because we assume that the supply of capital is inﬁnite, but the
number of employees is ﬁnite, ﬁrms that do not choose a level of debt that maximizes the
employee’s utility will not be able to hire an employee. Consequently, all ﬁrms that are in
business will pick the debt level that maximizes the employee’s utility. We therefore derive
an explicit expression for the employee’s indirect utility as a function of the level of debt
under the optimal employment contract, and then optimize this function to ﬁnd the optimal
debt level.
134.1 Wage Contract
To derive closed form expressions for ﬁrm value and employee utility requires making further
restrictive assumptions. The ﬁrst is that φt follows a random walk,
dφt = σ dZ. (16)
With this assumption, the variance of φt remains constant, and neither the value of the ﬁrm
nor the optimal contract depends explicitly on t. The optimal labor contract can now be




















Furthermore, because the value of equity, Vt, does not depend on t, we will henceforth write
V (φt,φt) ≡ Vt.









The following proposition (with proof in the appendix) derives expressions for the value of
the ﬁrm’s equity and the employee’s optimal wage contract for a given level of debt:











r + K − D(1 − τ) if φt ≥ φ∗
Q(φt)e
√
2r φt/σ + G(φt)e−
√
2r φt/σ if φt < φ∗
and the functions H(·),M(·),Q(·), and G(·) are given in the appendix. The competitive







































































To plot the value of equity, we use the parameters listed in Table 1. The model is far
too simple to capture all the complexities of actual capital structure decisions, but we can
use it to evaluate whether, for economically realistic parameters, human capital risk can
eﬀectively counterbalance the tax advantage of debt. We use a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 2,
consistent with values derived from experiments, and a tax rate of 20% (lower than the U.S.
corporate income tax rate) to compensate for the tax advantage of equity at the personal
level. We pick an initial φ0 = φ = 1, and K = 50. With r = 3%, this implies that the
revenue attributable to capital is Kr = 1.5, so the revenue attributable to labor is two thirds
the revenue attributable to capital.10
Variable Symbol Value
Capital K 50
Initial φ φ 1
Risk Aversion γ 2
Interest Rate r 3%
Tax Rate τ 20%
Standard Deviation σ 20%
Table 1: Parameter Values
Figure 1 plots the value of equity under the optimal wage contract as a function of the
employee’s ability for the parameter values listed in Table 1 and a debt-to-equity ratio of
1.04 (we shall show presently that this level of debt is optimal). The value of equity equals
the initial equity investment any time the employee earns his competitive market wage, and
at bankruptcy. At all other points, the value of equity is below the amount of the initial
equity investment. This implies that the value of the ﬁrm can never exceed its value were its
human capital to be replaced. This is the opposite of what q theory predicts about physical
capital. There, the value of the ﬁrm is never lower than the replacement value of physical
10At ﬁrst glance this choice might seem at odds with the empirical estimate of labor’s share of income
of about 75%, (see, for example, Krueger (1999)), but that estimate is derived from the national income
accounts and is unlikely to be representative of labor’s share of revenue of a publicly traded corporation. A
reason ﬁrms choose to go public is access to capital markets, so capital intensive ﬁrms are much more likely
to go public.
15capital. Note that equity holders always receive a fair market return because, when the
employee is hired, she is hired at a wage below her ability — c = 0.625 in this case, and
her initial ability is φ = 1. This diﬀerence, plus the tax shield, generates a positive cash
ﬂow (dividend) to equity holders that compensates for the drop in the value of equity, and
guarantees equity holders the competitive market expected return.
Figure 1: Value of Equity: The plot shows the value of equity as a function of employee
ability (φ) between φ = −0.96 and φ = 1. The parameter values are listed in Table 1 with
a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.04, which is optimal.
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4.2 Employee’s Utility
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where ct follows the optimal wage policy derived in Proposition 2 until bankruptcy, and is
equal to zero thereafter. The following proposition (with proof in the appendix) derives an
explicit expression for J, under the assumption that the employee’s preferences are given by
u(c) = −e
−γc.







2r φt/σ + B(φt)e−
√
2r φt/σ − e−γc∗(φ)
r if φt ≥ φ∗
C(φt)e
√
2r φt/σ + F(φt)e−
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if φt < φ∗
where the functions A(·),B(·),C(·), and F(·) are given in the appendix.
The black line in Figure 2 shows the derived utility function, J, as a function of the
debt-to-equity ratio for the parameters in Table 1. Note the utility is maximized when the
debt-to-equity ratio is 1.04, the ratio we used to generate Figure 1.
Figure 2: Employee’s Derived Utility: The black curve shows the employee’s utility, J,
as a function of the debt-to-equity ratio for the parameters in Table 1. The colored curves
show the employees utility with just the indicated parameter changed to the value indicated
on the curve. The arrows mark the maximum value of each function, that is, the optimal
debt-to-equity ratio.


















To illustrate the cross-sectional implications of our model, Figure 2 also plots the derived
utility function for diﬀerent parameter values. Each line is the derived utility function with
parameter values given in Table 1 with one parameter changed — this parameter takes the
value indicated on each curve. As the plot makes clear, the model is capable of generating
17large cross-sectional dispersion in debt-to-equity ratios. If the tax rate is doubled to 40%,
the optimal debt-equity ratio rises to 2.25. On the other hand, if either the volatility of
the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows or the risk aversion of the employee is increased by 50%, the optimal
debt-equity ratio is cut approximately in half. Similarly, if the labor intensity of the ﬁrm
is increased by reducing the amount of capital to 16.67, so that only one third of revenue
is attributable to capital, the debt-equity ratio drops to -0.2, that is, the ﬁrm holds cash,
despite its tax disadvantages (the ﬁrm must pay tax on the interest earned, whereas investors
do not because there are no personal income taxes in this model).
4.3 The Optimal Level of Debt
The optimal level of debt is chosen to maximize the employee’s derived utility function.




Given our explicit expression for J in Proposition 3, this equation is relatively straightforward
to solve numerically, the only complication being that c∗(φ) is only deﬁned implicitly (in
Proposition 2).
We begin by exploring the relation between risk aversion and leverage. Figure 3 plots the
optimal debt-to-equity ratio as a function of the level of employee risk aversion, γ, for three
diﬀerent levels for the volatility of employee productivity, σ. It conﬁrms what is intuitively
clear in our model — leverage is related to employees’ willingness to bear risk. Firms with
more risk averse employees optimally have lower levels of leverage, as do ﬁrms with more
volatile labor productivity. When employees value human capital insurance more (either
because they are more risk averse, or because their productivity is more volatile), ﬁrms
optimally respond by reducing debt (and thus give up tax shields) to enhance risk sharing.
These results suggest two empirical implications of our model. All else equal, ﬁrms with
more idiosyncratic volatility should hold less debt, as should ﬁrms with more risk averse
employees. This relation between leverage and employee risk aversion is, to our knowledge,
an inference unique to this model, and has not yet been investigated.
At ﬁrst blush, risk aversion might appear to be an unlikely driver of cross-sectional
variation in ﬁrm leverage. The corporations that comprise most studies have thousands
of employees; if diﬀerences in risk aversion amongst employees are uncorrelated with each
other, the average risk aversion of a typical employee in diﬀerent ﬁrms will be about the
same. However, an important implication of our model is that diﬀerences in risk aversion
are unlikely to be uncorrelated within a ﬁrm. To understand why, ﬁrst note from Figure 3
18Figure 3: Optimal D/E as a Function of Employee Risk Aversion: The plot shows
the optimal debt-to-equity ratio as a function of the level of risk aversion,γ, at three diﬀerent
levels of volatility in labor productivity, σ. The values of the remaining parameters are listed
in Table 1.













that the ﬁrm’s optimal leverage is related to the risk-aversion of its employees. This implies
that it is not optimal for all (otherwise identical) ﬁrms to have the same leverage in an
economy in which employees have diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. Less risk averse employees
are better oﬀ working for ﬁrms with higher leverage, and more risk averse employees are
better oﬀ working for ﬁrms with lower leverage. Hence, because new hires will select ﬁrms
based on their leverage (and oﬀered wages), they will prefer to work for ﬁrms with employees
that have similar levels of risk aversion. Firms therefore preferentially hire employees with
similar preferences, and so cross-sectional diﬀerences in risk aversion, and thus leverage,
should persist.
Because employee risk aversion is unobservable, its role in capital structure cannot be
directly tested. However, as Figure 4 demonstrates, the relation between wages and leverage
can be used as an indirect test of the importance of employee risk aversion in explaining cross-
sectional variation in ﬁrm capital structure. As is evident from the plot, higher leverage is
associated with higher wages, even after controlling for other sources of wage diﬀerentials
such as cash ﬂow volatility. Thus, wages should have explanatory power in explaining ﬁrm
leverage. Although controlling for other sources of wage diﬀerentials is diﬃcult, this result
19Figure 4: Firms with Higher Leverage Pay Higher Wages: The plot shows the cross-
sectional distribution of initial wages, c0, and debt levels for ﬁrms that vary in their employee
risk aversion (as plotted in Figure 3). Each line corresponds to diﬀerent levels of volatility
in labor productivity.













has the potential to explain at least some of the large unexplained persistent cross-sectional
variation in leverage within industries documented in Lemmon et al. (2006).
Figure 5 plots the optimal debt-to-equity ratio as a function of the fraction of revenues
attributable to capital, for a tax rate of 20%. Keeping φ0 = 1, the amount of capital, K,
is varied from 3 to 333, corresponding to a variation in the fraction of revenue attributable
to capital from 9% to 91%. From the ﬁgure, labor intensive ﬁrms have lower levels of debt,
something that is, at least anecdotally, characteristic of the economy. In support of the
anecdotal evidence, Rajan and Zingales (1995) ﬁnd that the ratio of ﬁxed assets to book
value of assets is signiﬁcantly positively related to leverage in almost every country they
study. Because this ratio is likely to be higher for capital intensive ﬁrms, their result is
consistent with the predictions of our model. Furthermore, as the ﬁgure makes clear, at low
tax rates or high levels of productivity volatility, even ﬁrms that are not labor intensive may
hold signiﬁcant levels of cash, despite its tax disadvantages. Finally, the fact that capital
intensive ﬁrms tend to be large (especially if accounting numbers are used as a measure
20of ﬁrm size), also implies that larger ﬁrms should have higher leverage, which is consistent
with the empirical evidence.11 An interesting question is what the cross-sectional variation
Figure 5: Firm Size and Debt Levels: The plot shows the optimal debt-to-equity ratio
as a function of the amount of capital K, expressed as a percentage of revenue attributable
to capital (K is varied from 3 to 333). The black curve uses the values of the parameters
listed in Table 1. The colored curves plot the optimal debt-to-equity ratio with the indicated
parameter set equal to the value indicated on the curve and the remaining parameters set
equal to the values listed in Table 1.









% of V alue in Capital
in the capital versus labor intensity of ﬁrms implies about wages. For a given level of debt,
labor intensive industries have a higher probability of bankruptcy, so one would expect higher
wages in these industries. However, these ﬁrms endogenously respond by issuing less debt (or
even holding cash), thus decreasing the probability of bankruptcy. Figure 6 shows that this
endogenous response is enough to reverse the initial eﬀect: Holding the initial productivity
of labor ﬁxed, capital intensive ﬁrms, and hence larger ﬁrms, pay higher wages. This relation
between ﬁrm size and wages is a robust characteristic of the data, and is regarded as a puzzle
by labor economists (see Brown and Medoﬀ (1989)).
11See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995)
21Figure 6: Physical Capital Intensive Firms Pay Higher Wages: The plot shows the
cross-sectional distribution of initial wages, c0, (at optimal debt levels) for diﬀerent levels
of physical capital (K is varied from 3 to 333). The black curve uses the values of the
parameters listed in Table 1. The colored curves plot wages for the indicated parameter set
equal to the value indicated on the curve and the remaining parameters set equal to the
values listed in Table 1.
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22It is important to emphasize that the relation between leverage and capital intensity
depends on our assumption about the relative risks of labor and capital. If we had instead
assumed that capital was risky and labor riskless, these inferences would be reversed. How-
ever, there are good reasons to suppose that, in general, labor is indeed riskier than capital.
First, note that the beneﬁts of risk sharing between the corporation and the employee are
related only to idiosyncratic risk — there is no obvious reason to share systematic risk.
Clearly, capital uncertainty is likely to have large systematic components, while labor uncer-
tainty, because it depends on the employee’s own ability, is likely to be mainly idiosyncratic.
Second, key employees, such as the CEO, can make idiosyncratic decisions that have large
consequences for the ﬁrm. Third, given the assumptions in our model, the observed posi-
tive correlation between wages and ﬁrm size is, by itself, evidence that labor is riskier than
capital.
5 Discussion
An implication of this paper is that employees should care about the ﬁrm’s likelihood of
bankruptcy. However, in many cases, employees may not be able to calculate the precise
relation between leverage and bankruptcy, so other more readily interpretable variables are
likely to play a role in capital structure decisions. One such variable is the ﬁrm’s credit rating.
Although most employees are unlikely to be able to relate leverage levels to bankruptcy
probabilities, rating agencies perform this mapping for them and publish their results. Hence,
a ﬁrm’s credit rating should be an independent determinant of its capital structure, an
empirical result documented in Kisgen (2006).
Because the likelihood of entrenchment is greater in ﬁrms with less debt, our model pre-
dicts an inverse relation between leverage and entrenchment. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack
(1997) and Kayhan (2003) both ﬁnd that ﬁrms with employees who appear more entrenched
have low leverage. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) investigate the eﬀect of managerial entrench-
ment on market valuation. Consistent with the predictions of our model, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with managers that are more likely to be entrenched display lower Q-ratios. They leave as
a puzzle why shareholders would voluntarily engage in what they identify as suboptimal
behavior. A contribution of our model is the insight that is is not necessarily suboptimal to
let employees become entrenched, even if, ex post this entrenchment leads to lower Q-ratios.
There is also empirical evidence consistent with our assumption that bankruptcy can
beneﬁt the investors in a ﬁrm because existing employees are ﬁred or their wages are re-
set to competitive levels. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) ﬁnd that almost 1/3 of all CEOs
are replaced after bankruptcy. Those who keep their job experience large salary cuts (35%
23or so). Further, when new outside managers are hired, they are paid 36% more than the
ﬁred managers, consistent with our prediction that employees take pay cuts when the ﬁrm
is in distress. Finally, Kalay et al. (2007) ﬁnd that ﬁrms experience signiﬁcant improve-
ments in operating performance during Chapter 11 bankruptcy, suggesting that, by ﬁring
old employees and hiring new ones at their market wage, value is created.
A key insight that emerges from our analysis is the role of bankruptcy in limiting the
potential to write explicit or implicit contracts with employees. Although bankruptcy is
probably the most important mechanism that allows ﬁrms to abrogate existing contracts,
other mechanisms, such as takeovers, also exist. When a ﬁrm is merged into another com-
pany, it becomes easier to fully or partially abrogate implicit (and possibly also explicit)
contracts. Consistent with this view, Pontiﬀ, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990) ﬁnd that hostile
takeovers are followed by an abnormally high incidence of pension asset reversions, which
account for approximately 11% of takeover gains. That hostile takeovers may create value
gains ex post is widely recognized. What this paper adds is that they also limit the risk
sharing possibilities ex ante, which potentially might explain why the majority of ﬁrms have
adopted anti-takeover provisions. Our analysis also suggests that the use of anti-takeover
devices may be systematically related to ﬁrms’ human capital and leverage characteristics.
A risk-sharing view of capital structure is also in accordance with survey results reported
by Graham and Harvey (2001). They ﬁnd that the most important determinant of capital
structure choice is ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and maintaining a good credit rating. By contrast,
they ﬁnd little evidence for asset substitution or asymmetric information as important factors
for capital structure choice. Clearly, ﬁrms with good credit rating and ﬁnancial ﬂexibility
can share human capital risk more eﬀectively with employees than ﬁrms with poor ratings
and low ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. This might explain why managers focus on these particular
determinants.
6 Conclusion
According to the dominant corporate ﬁnance paradigm, capital structure choice is a tradeoﬀ
between the costs and beneﬁts of debt. Although there is broad agreement amongst aca-
demics and practitioners on the beneﬁts of debt, identifying its costs remains one of the
biggest puzzles in corporate ﬁnance. Most existing papers on capital structure require ﬁrms
(or their investors) to bear sizeable bankruptcy costs, but the empirical evidence does not
support this. In contrast, there is evidence that bankruptcy costs borne by employees of the
ﬁrm are signiﬁcant, yet these have not received much attention in the ﬁnance literature. Our
analysis demonstrates that, at reasonable parameter values, the bankruptcy costs borne by
24employees do, in fact, provide a ﬁrst-order counterbalance to the tax beneﬁts of debt.
Analyzing the human cost of bankruptcy generates a rich set of empirical predictions.
First, the model produces moderate leverage ratios, implying an apparent “underutilization”
of debt tax shields if these costs are ignored. Second, the model predicts variation in the
average risk aversion of employees across ﬁrms, and that this variation should result in
persistent variation in leverage ratios. Third, highly levered ﬁrms should pay higher wages
to their employees. Fourth, capital intensive ﬁrms in our model have higher optimal leverage
ratios and pay higher wages. Finally, riskier ﬁrms choose lower leverage ratios.
An important simplifying assumption in our model is that we do not allow ﬁrms to
make severance payments to ﬁred employees prior to bankruptcy. Relaxing this assumption
would complicate the analysis appreciably, but would not qualitatively change the results.
Although the optimal contract would allow a ﬁrm to ﬁre an employee prior to bankruptcy, it
would still require that the ﬁrm continue to pay this employee the contracted wage. A new
replacement employee would be hired at a competitive wage, and the ﬁrm would now pay
wages to current and all past employees. At the point of bankruptcy the ﬁrm stops making
all wage payments (to both past and newly ﬁred employees), so employees still continue to
trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of insurance against the beneﬁts of the tax shield. Moreover, such a
contract is Pareto improving only if moral hazard concerns are ignored. In reality, the moral
hazard beneﬁts employees derive from being ﬁred (they continue to earn an above market
wage from their old employer and they can then supplement this income with a new job at
the market wage) most likely explain why such contracts are uncommon.
Key to our results is the assumption that employment contracts do not survive bankruptcy.
Given the costs imposed by the bankruptcy process on the employees of the ﬁrm, it is per-
haps surprising that in reality ﬁrms do not write employment contracts that survive the
bankruptcy process. For example, one solution, that is in principle available, would be for
ﬁrms to issue zero coupon senior perpetual debt to its employees. The only eﬀect this debt
would have would be in bankruptcy, when it ensures that the employees gain control of the
ﬁrm because they hold the most senior claims. The most likely reason we do not see such
contracts is the associated moral hazard — in this case employees would have an incentive
to drive the ﬁrm into bankruptcy. Indeed, as DeMarzo and Fishman (2006) show, this kind
of moral hazard can, by itself, be a determinant of ﬁrms’ capital structures.
Relaxing some of our simplifying assumptions would lead to interesting extensions of the
model. Both dividend policy and dynamic capital structure decisions are exogenous in our
model — the ﬁrm pays out all excess cash as dividends, and never changes the level of debt.
Allowing a manager to choose an optimal dynamic dividend policy, or change the amount of
debt and equity outstanding, is likely to yield interesting new insights. More generally, we
25believe that recognizing the interaction between labor and capital markets opens a new and
exciting path for future research in corporate ﬁnance. Analyzing the resulting implications
could signiﬁcantly improve our understanding of corporate behavior.
26Appendix
A Lemmas
Lemma 1 The market wage contract initiated at time ν cannot pay a lower wage than the
market wage contract initiated at any later time: c∗
ν,s ≥ c∗
ˆ ν,s for all s ≥ ˆ ν ≥ ν.
Proof: The result follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the wage c∗ in the market wage




























Lemma 2 At initiation, the market wage contract pays the promised wage, that is, c∗
t,t =
c∗(φt,t).
Proof: Assume not, that is, assume that the initial wage is the ﬁnancial distress wage, and







If this condition is not met before time T, then deﬁne ν = T. By Lemma 1, iterated








































































the last line following by replacing c∗
t,s with the ﬁnancial distress wage.
27B Proof of Proposition 1















the market wage contract at time 0. The proof of this proposition closely follows that of
Proposition 1 in Harris and Holmstr¨ om (1982). We ﬁrst show the policy in (19) is feasible.
Equation (12) is automatically satisﬁed by our deﬁnition of ct in Equation (19). Equa-
















t,s)(1 − τ) + Drτ)ds

= 0,
the last line following from the deﬁnition of the market wage contract initiated at date t.
Thus the market wage contract at time 0 satisﬁes Equation (11), and is hence feasible.
Next, we deﬁne speciﬁc Lagrange multipliers, and show that this compensation policy,
together with those Lagrange multipliers, maximizes the Lagrangian and satisﬁes the com-
plementary slackness conditions for the program (9)–(12). The Lagrangian can be written
(after ﬁrst multiplying the constraints (11) and (12) by the unconditional probability of the


















µt ≤ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to Equation (12), and dλs(φs) ≤ 0 is the




t − µt. (22)



















When ct is given by (19) the ﬁrst order conditions given by Equation (22) with these Lagrange
multipliers are satisﬁed. Because the maximum inside the bracket in Equation (23) is always




≤ 0 when c∗(φt,t) = max0≤s≤t {c∗(φs,s)},
= 0 otherwise.
(25)
In words, dλt is only non-negative when the employee earns his competitive market wage
(because, by Lemma 2 the ﬁrm can never be in distress when the employee earns his com-
petitive wage) or equivalently when (11) binds. Thus, dλt = 0 whenever (11) does not bind.
Equation (24) immediately tells us that
µt
(
= 0 when ct = max0≤s≤t {c∗(φs,s)},
≤ 0 otherwise,
(26)
so µt = 0 whenever (12) does not bind. Hence, we have complementary slackness and a
solution to the problem. Finally, note that because u(·) is concave and the constraints form
a convex set, the problem has a unique solution. The contract deﬁned by Equation (13) is
thus the unique solution to the original program, Equations (9)–(12).
C Proof of Proposition 2
By Ito’s Lemma, when φt < φt,





In equilibrium, shareholders must earn a fair rate of return on their investment, implying
that
E(dV ) = (rV − δt) dt,




2Vφφ − rV + δt = 0. (28)
From Equation (1), the dividend is given by
δt =
(
Kr − Dr(1 − τ) + (φt − c∗(φ))(1 − τ) if φ ≥ φ∗,
0 otherwise.
(29)
Equation (28) thus takes two diﬀerent forms, depending on whether or not the ﬁrm is cur-




2Vφφ − rV + Kr − Dr(1 − τ) + (φ − c







f = 0 otherwise. (31)
The notation V f here is used to indicate the equity value when the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress.
The general solutions to equations (30) and (31) are
V (φ,φ) = H(φ)e
√




(φ − c∗(φ))(1 − τ)
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To pin down the four unknown functions H, M, Q and G, we need four boundary conditions.
The ﬁrst, applying at the upper boundary φ = φ, is12
∂
∂φ
   
φ=φ
V (φ,φ) = 0. (34)
At the point the ﬁrm enters ﬁnancial distress, φ∗, the values and derivatives must be matched,










Finally, at the point of bankruptcy (when the ﬁrm cannot meet its interest obligations even
if the employee gives up all his wages), φ, the ﬁrm ﬁres the employee and replaces him with
12See Goldman, Sosin, and Gatto (1979).
30an employee who puts the capital to full productive use, so
V
f(φ,φ) = K − D. (37)
These four boundary conditions are suﬃcient to pin down H, M, Q and G for any given
speciﬁcation of the wage function. However, we also want to determine the optimal wage
function, c∗(φ). This requires an additional condition, which is that the value of equity at
the moment the manager is hired must be equal to K − D, i.e.,
V (φ,φ) = K − D. (38)
As written, the ﬁve equations (34)–(38), are enough in principle to determine H, M, Q, G
and c∗, but applying them directly results in o.d.e.s for each function, due to the presence
of the φ derivative in Equation (34). To eliminate this derivative, we replace Equation (34)
with another (equivalent) condition. To do this, note that because Equation (38) holds for























V (φ,φ) = 0. (39)


















































































































































































































































It is straightforward to show that ∆(φ,D,c) always has a unique root between φ+ Drτ
1−τ − σ √
2r
and φ + Drτ
1−τ.13
D Proof of Proposition 3




2Jφφ − rJ + u(c) = 0. (41)
13Proof available on request from the authors.
32The manager’s pay, c, is given by
c =
(






= φ − φ otherwise.
(42)
Equation (41) thus takes two diﬀerent forms, depending on whether or not the ﬁrm is cur-




2Jφφ − rJ − e








−γ(φ−φ) = 0 otherwise. (44)
The notation Jf is used here to emphasize that J is being calculated when the ﬁrm is in
ﬁnancial distress. The general solutions to these p.d.e.s are
J(φ,φ) = A(φ)e
√



















To determine the functions A, B, C and F, we need the following boundary conditions. The






−rtu(0)dt = −1/r. (47)











The ﬁnal boundary conditions are
∂
∂φ
   
φ=φ
J(φ,φ) = 0, (50)
lim
φ→∞
J(φ,φ) = 0. (51)
33The ﬁrst of these is analogous to Equation (34), and the second follows from the fact that,
when φ is very large, so is the manager’s compensation, and
lim
c→∞u(c) = 0.






































































































 + A(φ). (55)
The ﬁnal boundary condition, (51), is required to pin down the constant of integration in
the expression for A(φ). When φ goes to inﬁnity, so does φ, implying that limφ→∞ A(φ) = 0.
A suﬃcient condition for the convergence of the integral in (52) is
√
2r/σ < γ.
Although we do not have an analytic expression for c∗(u), an analytic expression for
∂c∗(u)
∂u
can be derived by ﬁrst noting that ∆(u,D,c∗(u)) = 0 for any value of u, and then (totally)
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